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Abstract: Policymakers have recently expressed concerns over the role of recommendation 
algorithms and their role in forming “filter bubbles”. This is a particularly prescient concern in the 
context of extremist content online; these algorithms may promote extremist content at the 
expense of more moderate voices. In this article, we make two contributions to this debate. Firstly, 
we provide a novel empirical analysis of three platforms’ recommendation systems when 
interacting with far-right content. We find that one platform—YouTube—does amplify extreme and 
fringe content, while two—Reddit and Gab—do not. Secondly, we contextualise these findings into 
the regulatory debate. There are currently few policy instruments for dealing with algorithmic 
amplification, and those that do exist largely focus on transparency. We argue that policymakers 
have yet to fully understand the problems inherent in “de-amplifying” legal, borderline content and 




Recent years have seen a substantial increase of concern by policymakers towards 
the impact and role of personalisation algorithms on social media users. A key 
concern is that users are shown more content with which they agree at the ex-
pense of cross-cutting viewpoints, creating a false sense of reality and potentially 
damaging civil discourse (Vīķe‐Freiberga et al., 2013). While human beings have 
always tended to gravitate towards opinions and individuals that align with their 
own beliefs at the expense of others (Sunstein, 2002), so called “filter bubbles” are 
singled out as being particularly problematic because they are proposed to artifi-
cially exacerbate this confirmation bias without a user’s knowledge (Pariser, 2011). 
The filter bubble debate is complex and often ill-defined; encompassing research 
into timelines, feeds, and news aggregators (Bruns, 2019), often trying to establish 
the importance of these algorithms versus a user’s own personal choice (see e.g., 
Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 2015; Dylko et al., 2017). We lay our contribution on 
one specific aspect of the debate—the role of social media platforms’ recommen-
dation systems and interaction with far-right extremist content. Policymakers have 
articulated concern that these algorithms may be amplifying problematic content 
to users which may exacerbate the process of radicalisation (HM Government, 
2019; Council of the European Union, 2020). This has also become a concern in 
popular news media, spawning articles which highlight the importance of recom-
mender systems in The Making of a YouTube Radical (Roose, 2019), or referring to 
the platform as The Great Radicalizer (Tufekci, 2018) or as having radicalised Brazil 
and caused Jair Bolsonaro’s election victory (Fisher & Taub, 2019). Research into 
this phenomenon (discussed in more detail below) does seem to support the no-
tion that recommendation systems can amplify extreme content, yet the empirical 
research tends to focus on a single platform—YouTube—or is observational or 
anecdotal in nature. 
We contribute to this debate in two ways: firstly, we conduct an empirical analysis 
of interactions of recommendation systems and far-right content on three plat-
forms—YouTube, Reddit, and Gab. This analysis provides a novel contribution by 
being the first study to account for personalisation in an experimental setting, 
which has been noted as a limitation by previous empirical research (Ledwich and 
Zaitsev, 2019; Ribeiro et al., 2019). We find that one platform—YouTube—does pro-
mote extreme content after interacting with far-right materials, but the other two 
do not. Secondly, we contextualise these findings into the policy debate, surveying 
the existing regulatory instruments, highlighting the challenges that are faced, be-
fore arguing that a co-regulatory approach may offer the ability to overcome these 
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challenges while providing safeguards and respecting democratic norms. 
Filter bubbles 
Originally articulated by Eli Pariser, the concept filter bubbles posits that personali-
sation algorithms may act as “autopropaganda” by invisibly controlling what web 
users do and do not see, promoting ideas that users are already in agreement with 
and, in doing so, dramatically amplifying confirmation bias (Pariser, 2011). He 
claims that the era of personalisation began in 2009 when Google announced that 
they would begin to filter search results based on previous interactions which cre-
ates a personalised universe of information for each user, which may contain in-
creasingly less diverse viewpoints and therefore increase polarisation within soci-
ety. Since Pariser’s original contribution, online platforms have further developed 
and emphasised their personalisation algorithms beyond “organic” interactions. De 
Vito notes that Facebook’s News Feed is ‘a constantly updated, personalized ma-
chine learning model, which changes and updates outputs based on your behav-
iour…Facebook’s formula, to the extent that it actually exists, changes every day’ 
(DeVito, 2016, p. 16), while YouTube’s marketing director told a UK House of Com-
mons select committee that around 70% of content watched on the platform was 
derived from recommendations rather than users’ organic searches (Azeez, 2019). 
Many scholars have highlighted concerns over such algorithms, such as them car-
rying the biases of their human designers (Bozdog, 2013); conflating the distinc-
tion between user satisfaction and retention (Seaver, 2018), which may blind users 
to important social events (Napoli, 2015); people not being aware of how they re-
strict information (Eslami et al., 2015; Bucher, 2017); and even their creators not 
fully understanding how they operate (Napoli, 2014; DeVito, 2016). In the context 
of extremism, each of these concerns may cause alarm as they posit a situation in 
which users may become insulated with confirming information in an opaque sys-
tem. 
In turn, a widespread concern has grown in policy circles. The EU Group on Media 
Freedom and Pluralism suggests that it may have adverse effects: ‘Increasing fil-
tering mechanisms makes it more likely for people to only get news on subjects 
they are interested in, and with the perspective they identify with…Such develop-
ments undoubtedly have a potentially negative impact on democracy’ 
(Vīķe‐Freiberga et al., 2013, p. 27). More recently, the filter bubble effect has been 
blamed as a critical enabler of perceived failures of democracy such as the pop-
ulist elections of Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and the Brexit referendum (Bruns, 
2019). In the US, lawmakers have been considering legislative options to regulate 
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social media algorithms. The proposed bipartisan “Filter Bubble Transparency Act” 
which, at time of writing is awaiting passage through the US Senate, claims to 
‘make it easier for internet platform users to understand the potential manipula-
tion that exists with secret algorithms’ (Filter Bubble Transparency Act, 2019, S, 
LYN19613). 
Importantly to the aims of this paper, the role of personalisation algorithms pro-
moting extreme content has been highlighted by policymakers as a prescient con-
cern. After the Christchurch terror attack in 2019, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Jacinda Arden and French President Emmanuel Macron brought together several 
heads of state and tech companies to propose the Christchurch Call. The Call com-
mitted governments to, amongst other things, ‘review the operation of algorithms 
and other processes that may drive users towards and/or amplify terrorist and vio-
lent extremist content’ (Christchurch Call, 2019). The Call was signed by the Euro-
pean Commission, the Council of Europe, and 49 nation states. The UK government 
has also signalled personalisation algorithms as problematic in its Online Harms 
White Paper, noting that they can lead to echo chambers and filter bubbles which 
can skew users towards extreme and unreliable content (HM Government, 2019). 
Similarly, the UK’s Commission for Countering Extremism called on tech companies 
to ‘ensure that their technologies have a built-in commitment to equality, and that 
their algorithms and systems do not give extremists the advantage from the start 
by feeding existing biases’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019, p. 86). In 
2020, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator released a report which argued that 
online platforms are a conduit for polarisation and radicalisation because their 
recommendation systems promote content linked to strong negative emotions, in-
cluding extreme content (Council of the European Union, 2020). 
Many scholars have criticised filter bubbles as being a problematic concept. Bruns 
notes that Pariser’s original formulation as being founded in anecdotes, for which 
there is scant empirical evidence. He argues that the disconnect between the pub-
lic understanding of the concept and the scientific evidence has all the hallmarks 
of a moral panic which distract from more important matters, such as changing 
communications landscapes and increasing polarisation (Bruns, 2019). Munger & 
Phillips also criticise the prominent theory of YouTube radicalisation via algorithm, 
which is often purported in the media. They argue that this argument is tanta-
mount to the now-discredited “Hypodermic Needle” model of mass communica-
tions and instead posit a “supply” and “demand” framework which emphasises 
both the affordances that the platform offers as well as a greater focus on the au-
dience (Munger and Phillips, 2019). 
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Despite concerns by academics and policymakers, there is limited empirical evi-
dence as to the extent (or harmfulness) of filter bubbles (Zuiderveen Borgesius et 
al., 2016); research tends to suggest that social media users have a more diverse 
media diet than non-users (Bruns, 2019). Studies have shown that personalisation 
algorithms do filter towards an ideological position and can increase political po-
larisation (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic, 2015 1; Dylko et al., 2018) but that they 
play a smaller role than users’ own choices. Several studies have also studied the 
role of news recommendation systems, finding that the concerns over personalised 
recommendations are overstated (Haim, Graefe, and Brosius, 2018), do not reduce 
the diversity of content to users (Möller et al., 2018), and are more likely to be dri-
ven by factors such as time or date than past behaviours (Courtois, Slechten, and 
Coenen, 2018). 
A key part of most of the critiques of the filter bubble as a concept is that it lacks 
clarity. There is little distinction made between the similar, yet different, concepts 
of filter bubbles and echo chambers (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016; Bruns, 
2019). This is problematic because it hinders ability to do robust research, studies 
may offer different findings because they employ radically different definitions of 
these concepts (Bruns, 2019). It is worthwhile to consider the distinction drawn by 
Zuiderveen Borgesius and colleagues, who distinguish between two types of per-
sonalisation: firstly, self-selected, in which the user chooses to encounter like-
minded views and opinions (i.e., an “echo chamber”) and secondly, pre-selected, 
which is driven by platforms without the user’s deliberate choice, input, knowledge 
or consent—i.e., a “filter bubble” (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016). This conceptu-
al confusion also extends to discussions of involvement in terrorism and extrem-
ism, Whittaker (2020) argues that studies have frequently posited a causative rela-
tionship between online echo chambers and radicalisation—with little empirical 
evidence—and they are rarely clear as to whether they refer to users’ own choices 
or the effects of algorithms. 
This conceptual distinction is important for the present study because social me-
dia recommendation systems do not fit easily into either the self-selected or pre-
selected categories. In all three of the platforms in consideration for the present 
study (YouTube, Reddit, and Gab), content is pre-selected for users, with which they 
then have the option to engage. This is different, for example, to Facebook’s News 
Feed in which users do not have this option. Given this ambiguity, it is worthwhile 
to be clear about the phenomena that are under consideration—recommendation 
1. It is worthwhile to note that this study was commissioned and undertaken by Facebook employees 
and studied the platform in question. 
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systems—which are defined by Ricci, Rokach and Shapira (2011) as software tools 
and techniques providing users with suggestions for items a user may wish to 
utilise. They expand upon this by stating ‘the suggestions relate to various deci-
sion-making processes, such as what items to buy, what music to listen to, or what 
online news to read’ (Ricci, Rokach and Shapira, 2011, p. 1). A user can navigate 
these platforms without utilising these systems—even if they happen to make up 
most of the traffic. Moreover, we define content amplification as the promotion of 
certain types of content—in this case far right extreme content—at the expense of 
more moderate viewpoints. 
Extremist content and recommendation systems 
There are a handful of existing studies which seek to explore the relationship be-
tween recommendation algorithms and extremist content, with a predominance 
towards YouTube. O’Callaghan et al. (2015) conducted an analysis of far-right con-
tent, finding that more extreme content can be offered to users and they may find 
themselves in an immersive ideological bubble in which they can be excluded 
from content which does not fit their belief system. Ribeiro et al. (2019) conducted 
an analysis of two million recommendations that were related to three categories: 
Alt-right, 2 Alt-Lite, 3 and Intellectual Dark Web. 4 They find that YouTube’s recom-
mendation algorithm frequently suggests Alt-lite and Intellectual Dark Web con-
tent, and once in these communities, it is possible to find the Alt-right from recom-
mended channels. This, they argue, supports the notion that YouTube has a “radi-
calisation pipeline”. Schmitt et al. (2018) study YouTube recommendations in the 
context of counter-messages designed to dissuade individuals from extremism. 
They utilise two seed campaigns (#WhatIS and ExitUSA), finding that the universe 
of related videos had a high crossover with radical propaganda, particularly the 
#WhatIS campaign which had several key words with thematic overlaps with Is-
lamist propaganda (for example: “jihad”). All three studies’ findings suggest that 
extremist content may be amplified via YouTube’s recommendation algorithm. 
Conversely, Ledwich and Zaitsev (2019) find that YouTube recommendation algo-
2. In their paper, they use the Anti-Defamation League’s description of the Alt-Right as: “Aloose seg-
ment of the white supremacist movement consisting of individuals who reject mainstream conser-
vatism in favor of politics that embrace racist, anti-Semitic and white supremacist ideology” 
(Ribeiro et al., 2019, p. 2). 
3. They argue that Alt-lite was created to demarcate individuals and content that engage in civil na-
tionalism, but deny a link to white supremacy. 
4. A group of contrarian academics and podcast hosts who discuss and debate a range of social issues 
such as abortion, LGBT issues, identity politics, and religion. 
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rithms actively discourage users from visiting extreme content online, which they 
claim refutes popular “radicalisation” claims. They develop a coding system for 
channels based on ideological categories (e.g., “Conspiracy”, “Revolutionary”, “Parti-
san Right”) as well as whether the channel was part of the mainstream news or in-
dependent YouTubers. They find no evidence of migration to extreme right chan-
nels—their data suggest that the recommendation algorithm appears to restrict 
traffic towards these categories and that users are instead directed towards main-
stream channels. Importantly, all four of these studies generate data by leveraging 
YouTube’s application programming interface (APIs) to retrieve data from respec-
tive platforms to analyse recommendations of extremist content. The data collec-
tion does not mimic the user-platform relationship that typically has users interact 
with content, includes repeated exposure to recommendations and continued in-
teractions with content from which an algorithm can learn and tailor content ac-
cordingly. As such, these studies do not consider personalisation which is at the 
core of the filter bubble hypothesis. This is acknowledged by both Ribeiro et al. 
(2019) and Ledwich and Zaitsev (2019) as limitations. 
Other studies have taken qualitative or observational approaches. Gaudette et al. 
(2020) studied Reddit’s upvoting and downvoting algorithm on the subreddit r/
The_Donald by taking a sample of the 1,000 most upvoted posts and comparing 
them to a random sample, finding that the upvoted sample contained extreme dis-
course which facilitated “othering” towards two outgroups—Muslims and the left. 
The authors argue that the upvoting algorithm plays a key role in facilitating an 
extreme collective identity on the subreddit. Baugut and Neumann (2020) conduct 
interviews with 44 radical Islamists on their media diet, finding that many individ-
uals began with only a basic interest in ideology but followed platforms’ recom-
mendations when they were shown radical propaganda, which propelled them to 
engage in violence. Both Berger (2013) and Waters and Postings (2018) observe 
that Twitter and Facebook respectively suggest radical jihadist accounts for users 
to follow after an individual begins to engage with extreme content, arguing that 
the platforms inadvertently create a network which helps to connect extremists. 
Looking at the existing literature, several inferences can be made. Firstly, little is 
known about the relationship between recommendation systems and the promo-
tion of extremist content; of the few studies that exist, a majority do suggest that 
these algorithms can promote extreme content, but it tends to focus on one plat-
form—YouTube—and mostly analyses the potential interaction between users and 
content or relies on collecting potential recommendations from platform APIs, 
rather than actual interactions based on personalisation. The focus on a single 
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platform is significant because research may be driven by convenience to re-
searchers due to YouTube’s open API rather than following the trail of extreme 
content. Secondly, when looking to the previous section and research into filter 
bubbles more broadly, despite theoretical apprehensions which can be alarmingly 
applied to the promotion of extremist content, the evidence base for this concern 
is limited, most studies tend to play down the effect, either suggesting that it does 
not exist or that users’ own choices play a bigger role in their decision-making. 
Methodology 
This study aims to empirically analyse whether social media recommendation sys-
tems can promote far-right extremist content on three platforms —YouTube, Red-
dit, and Gab. The Far-right was chosen to be the most appropriate ideology be-
cause it remains accessible on the internet because platforms have not been able 
to utilise the same methods of de-platforming as they used on jihadist content 
(Conway, 2020). Each of the platforms in question have been noted as hosting ex-
treme far-right material, for example: YouTube (O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Lewis, 
2018; Ottoni et al., 2018; Munger and Phillips, 2020; Van Der Vegt et al., 2020), 
Reddit (Conway, 2016; Copland, 2020; Gaudette et al., 2020), and Gab (Berger, 
2018b; Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair, 2019; Nouri, Lorenzo-Dus, and Watkin, 
2019). 
Our methodology adds an important contribution to the existing literature. Rather 
than utilising the results from an API to generate data on potential recommenda-
tions, which is common in the existing literature (O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Ledwich 
and Zaitsev, 2019; Ribeiro et al., 2019), we engage with social media recommenda-
tion systems via automated user accounts (bots) to observe content adjustments 
(recommendations). Retrieving potential recommendations via the API does not 
mimic the users' relationship to the platform because the algorithm has nothing to 
learn about an individual user and no personalisation takes place. On the other 
hand, our methodology utilises automated agents which create behavioural data 
that the algorithm uses to personalise recommendations. Therefore, we effectively 
recreate the conditions in which a real user finds itself when using a platform with 
a personalised recommendation system. A similar research design was conducted 
by Haim, Graefe and Brosius (2018), who created personalised accounts on Google 
News in order to study the political bias of news recommendations. However, there 
are no studies that utilise this methodology to assess the amplification of extrem-
ist content. Given the divergent platform architecture, we utilise three different de-
signs, explained below. 
8 Internet Policy Review 10(2) | 2021
YouTube 
We investigate whether extreme content was promoted after applying specific 
treatments. To do this, we created three identical accounts subscribed to the same 
20 YouTube channels: 10 far-right channels that were identified in the academic 
literature 5 and 10 apolitical content producers (for example, sport or weather). We 
subjected these accounts to three different treatments: 
1. Acting predominantly with far-right channels—the extreme interaction 
account (EIA); 
2. Acting predominantly with apolitical channels—the neutral interaction 
account (NIA); and 
3. Doing nothing at all—the baseline account (BA). 
Data were collected by visiting the YouTube homepage twice per day. Using the 
recommendation data, we proceeded to construct two variables of interest —the 
share and the rank of extreme, fringe, and moderate content. For the share of con-
tent, we divide the respective content of a specific category by the total number of 
content pieces by recommendation set. To determine rank, content that appears on 
top left is ranked as “1” so that for each content piece to the right and below the 
rank continuously increases. YouTube offers 18 recommended videos, so the data 
have a ranking of 1-18. This serves as a measurement of algorithm prioritisation as 
we can assume that content that is more easily accessible (e.g. more visible) will 
be consumed and viewed more. 
For the first week, the three accounts did not interact with any content and just 
visited the homepage twice a day to collect data. This serves as a baseline to be 
compared against the treatments. After a week, the three different treatments 
were applied. 20 videos were chosen (one from each channel), and all the accounts 
watched one to kickstart the recommendation algorithm. Each time an account 
visited the YouTube frontpage, ten videos were randomly chosen from the recom-
mendation tab. For the EIA, seven videos were chosen from far-right channels and 
three from neutral. The NIA watched seven neutral channels and three far-right. If 
this operation was not possible to perform because there were not enough videos 
from neutral or extreme channels present, videos were watched twice until the 
quota was met. If no video appeared from any of the initial 20 channels in any giv-
en session, the account would watch a video from the initial 20 videos that were 
used to kickstart the algorithm. 
5. The authors follow the policy of Vox-Pol and J M Berger by not identifying the names of accounts in 
this research, both for reasons of potentially increasing exposure and privacy. See, Berger (2018). 
9 Whittaker, Looney, Reed, Votta
Quasi-Poisson models were used to estimate rate ratios and expected frequency 
counts to test whether extremist or fringe content was more or less prevalent after 
treatments were applied (Agresti, 2013). To test for rank differences in content, 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests were chosen, a non-parametric alternative to the un-
paired two-samples t-test, which was chosen due to non-normality of the rank dis-
tribution (Kraska-Miller, 2013). 
Reddit 
The design for the Reddit experiment is almost identical to that of YouTube. We 
created three identical accounts and followed the same selection of far-right (in-
cluding male supremacist) and apolitical Subreddits. We left these accounts dor-
mant for one week to collect baseline data, before conducting three treatments: 
1. Extremist Interaction Account (EIA), which acted predominantly with far-
right content 
2. Neutral Interaction Account (NIA), which acted predominantly with neutral 
content 
3. Baseline Account (BA), which did not interact at all. 
As with YouTube, the two variables of interest were the share and rank of extreme 
and fringe content, which was decided based on where content appeared on Red-
dit’s “Best” timeline. Reddit offers 25 posts from top-to-bottom: giving the top re-
sult a rank of 1 through to the bottom of 25. The same procedure was followed as 
highlighted above; we collected data twice per day by logging in and viewing the 
recommended post, with the EIA interacting with seven posts from far-right sub-
reddits and three apolitical ones, and the NIA interacting with seven apolitical and 
three far-right. Again, Quasi-Poisson models were used to estimate rate ratios and 
expected frequency counts, and Wilcoxon rank sum tests were utilised to test dif-
ferences in rank. 
Gab 
Gab’s architecture is fundamentally different—and substantially more basic—re-
quiring a more simplistic approach. One function that Gab offers is the ability to 
choose between three different types of news feed: “Popular”, “Controversial”, and 
“Latest”. Although not made explicit by the platform, we judge the first two to be 
algorithmically driven by non-chronological factors, possibly related to Gab’s up-
vote and downvote system. However, “Latest” by definition, is based either entirely 
or primarily on the most recent posts, which offers the ability to analyse how algo-
rithmically recommended posts compare against a timeline influenced primarily by 
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recency. We collected data from each of the three timeline options for three of 
Gab’s topics: News, Politics, and Humour, creating nine different investigations in 
total. We then assessed how much extreme content appeared in each timeline. 
The experiments on YouTube and Reddit are relatively similar in aims and scope, 
while Gab’s investigation diverges. Therefore, the research questions are as fol-
lows: 
• RQ1: Does the amount of extreme content increase after applying treatments? 
(YouTube & Reddit) 
• RQ2: Is extreme content better ranked by the algorithm after applying 
treatments? (YouTube & Reddit) 
• RQ3: Do Gab’s different timelines promote extreme content? (Gab) 
Data were collected over a two-week period in January/February 2019. For 
YouTube and Reddit, the bots logged in twice per day, which created 28 different 
sessions, for a total of 1,443 videos (of which 949 were unique), and 2,100 posts 
on Reddit (of which 834 were unique). Unfortunately, during the data collection 
period, Gab experienced several technical issues resulting in disruptions to the 
site, meaning that the authors were only able to log in for five sessions. This still 
resulted in 1,271 posts being collected, of which 746 were unique, which we 
deemed adequate for an exploratory investigation. 
Coding 
Two members of the team coded the data using the Extremist Media Index (EMI), 
which was developed by Donald Holbrook and consists of three levels: Moderate, 
Fringe, and Extreme (Holbrook, 2015, 2017b, 2017a). For an item to be categorised 
as Extreme, it must legitimise or glorify the use of violence or involve stark dehu-
manisation that renders an audience sub-human. For Holbrook’s research, this cat-
egory also includes four sub-levels which relate to the specificity and immediacy 
of the violence, but for this study, the sample sizes were too small to produce reli-
able results. To be deemed Fringe, content had to be radical, but without justifica-
tions of violence. Anger or blame might also be expressed towards an out-group 
and may include profanity laden nicknames that go beyond political discourse 
(e.g., “libtards” or “feminazis”), or historical revisionism. All other content was 
deemed as Moderate, which can include references to specific out groups if it is 
deemed a part of acceptable political discourse. 
For inter-rater reliability, the two categorisers coded a random sample of 35 pieces 
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of content from each of the three platforms (105 in total). The two raters agreed in 
80.76% of cases: 74.3% on YouTube, 85.7% on Reddit, and 81.8% on Gab, yielding 
a Krippendoff’s alpha value of 0.74 (YouTube = 0.77, Reddit = 0.72, Gab = 0.73). 
These values are deemed acceptable to draw tentative conclusions from the data. 
The coders then categorised the remaining content on each platform. Only the 
original post/video was taken into account (i.e., not comments underneath or out-
ward links). In YouTube, many of the videos were multiple hours long, therefore 
raters had to make their decision based on the first five minutes. 
Two thirds of the collected data on YouTube was rated as Moderate (n=949), while 
28% was Fringe (409), and 6% was Extreme (85). On Reddit, almost four-fifths of 
the content was classified as Moderate (1,654) while 20% was Fringe (416) and 
less than 2% was Extreme (30). On Gab, 64% of posts were deemed to be Moderate 
(810), with 29% Fringe (366) and 7% was Extreme (95). 
Results 
RQ1: Does the amount of extreme content increase after applying 
treatments? 
On YouTube, we found that the account that predominantly interacted with far-
right materials (the EIA) was twice as likely to be shown Extreme content, and 1.39 
times more likely to be recommended Fringe content. Conversely, the NIA and BA 
were 2.96 and 3.23 times less likely to be shown Extreme content. These findings 
suggest that when users interact with far-right content on YouTube, it is further 
amplified to them in the future. 
On the other hand, Reddit’s recommendation algorithm does not seem to promote 
Extreme content with the EIA; none of the models show statistically significant ef-
fects, suggesting that interacting with far-right content does not increase the like-
lihood that a user is recommended further extreme content. 
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FIGURE 1: Predicted frequency of content per session (YouTube) for the EIA condition from Quasi-
Poisson model. 95% confidence interval shown. 
RQ2: Is extreme content better ranked by the algorithm after 
applying treatments? 
As with RQ1, we found that YouTube prioritises Extreme content; it ranked such 
content significantly higher than Moderate. In the EIA the median rank for the for-
mer was 5, while the latter was 10. There was no significant difference between 
the Fringe and Extreme or the Fringe and Moderate content. There was also no 
significant difference between the EMI categories in the NIA or BA. 
The results for RQ2 on Reddit also mirror those of RQ1; we found no statistically 
significant differences between any of the variables in the EIA. We did observe that 
the NIA does decrease the average rank of fringe content on the platform, which 
does point to a minor filtering effect. 
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FIGURE 2: Ranking by EMI scores for the EIA condition (YouTube) and test comparisons are 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests. * p < 0.05. 
RQ3: Do Gab’s timelines promote Extreme content? 
The exploratory investigation on Gab did not yield any differences in the promo-
tion of Extreme content in the nine observations (three timelines vs three topics). 
The content in the “Latest” and “Controversial” timelines showed no statistically 
significant differences with any of the EMI categories, and the “Popular” timeline 
shows a prioritisation for Fringe content above Moderate, but there is no statisti-
cally significant promotion of Extreme posts. 
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FIGURE 3: Ranking by EMI scores in the “Popular Timelines” on Gab. Test comparisons are Wilcoxon 
Rank sum tests. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
Policy discussion 
In this section, we synthesise our empirical findings with the existing literature 
and policy concerns. We assess the current regulatory approaches which are ad-
dressing the problem, finding that where there is explicit legislation, it is mostly 
focused on algorithmic transparency and there is currently a gap in understanding 
on how to deal with the problem of borderline content. We argue that a move to-
wards co-regulation between states, social media platforms, and other stakehold-
ers may help to address some problems and concerns. This includes a lack of ac-
countability, a homogenous approach in dealing with borderline content, and 
bridging knowledge gaps caused by the slow-moving pace of legislation. 
Our research suggests that YouTube can amplify extreme content towards its users 
after a user begins to interact with far-right content. From a policy perspective, 
this could affirm the concerns of several stakeholders that have highlighted this 
problem in recent years (HM Government, 2019; Council of the European Union, 
2020). RQ1 found that by applying a treatment of predominantly far-right content, 
users were significantly more likely to be recommended videos that were more ex-
treme. The converse was true, too; acting predominantly with neutral content 
made extreme content less likely to be shown. RQ2 found that after applying an 
extreme treatment, far-right content was ranked higher on average than moderate. 
This is in keeping with the empirical literature on YouTube, which suggests that 
recommended videos may promote extreme content (O’Callaghan et al., 2015; 
Schmitt et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2019; Baugut and Neumann, 2020). Importantly, 
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for RQ1 and RQ2, we add a novel contribution to the wider literature by creating 
experimental conditions with a baseline and controls which account for personali-
sation, rather than relying on content that could be recommended to users. 
It is also important to note that we find there to be minimal filtering of extreme 
content on both Reddit and Gab. However, we do find evidence of both extreme 
and fringe content on all three platforms—supported by research which posits the 
far-right as existing on the sites (O’Callaghan et al., 2015; Berger, 2018b; Lewis, 
2018; Conway, Scrivens, and Macnair, 2019; Nouri, Lorenzo-Dus, and Watkin, 2019; 
Copland, 2020; Gaudette et al., 2020). For Reddit and Gab, the lack of algorithmic 
promotion suggests that there are other factors, possibly related to the platforms’ 
other affordances or their user bases, that drive extreme content. To reiterate 
Munger and Phillips's (2019) point, it is important to consider both the “supply” 
and “demand” of radical content on social media platforms. This shows the interre-
lated nature of the debates surrounding concerns of algorithmic promotion of ex-
tremism and content removal. This, as we will expand on below, has its own set of 
challenges with which policymakers must deal when considering appropriate reg-
ulatory responses. 
Regulatory approaches 
Despite repeated concerns from policymakers, the amplification of extremist con-
tent by algorithms is currently a blind spot for social media regulation and ad-
dressing it presents challenges to legislators. One challenge is that current and 
planned national regulation is focused on the moderation and removal of illegal 
content rather than amplification. The UK Online Harms White Paper (2019) initial-
ly addressed the question of content amplification, subsequent consultations have 
seemingly relegated its importance. The German NetzDG (2017) avoids the issue 
of the amplification of extremist content through focusing on the removal of ille-
gal hate speech content alone. Both pieces of legislation are focused on regulating 
the removal of harmful—or illegal in the case of NetzDG—content from social me-
dia through the implementation of heavy fines if a platform does not implement 
mechanisms of notice and take downs. This is mirrored in the proposed legislation 
from the European Parliament on preventing terrorist content online (European 
Parliament, 2019). 
At time of writing the UK Online Harms Bill has not been presented to Parliament, 
therefore this information is derived from the Online Harms White Paper (HM Gov-
ernment, 2019) and accompanying responses. The Bill proposes a duty of care for 
platforms which covers terrorism and extremism. In the white paper, the UK gov-
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ernment referred to the issues surrounding the operation of algorithms and their 
role in amplifying extreme content; “Companies will be required to ensure that al-
gorithms selecting content do not skew towards extreme and unreliable material 
in the pursuit of sustained user engagement” (HM Government, 2019, p. 72). The 
white paper affirmed that the proposed regulator would have the power to inspect 
algorithms in situ to understand whether this leads to bias or harm. This power is 
analogous to the form of algorithmic auditing advocated by Mittelstadt, who ar-
gues for the “prediction of results from new inputs and explanation of the ratio-
nale behind decision, such as why a new input was assigned a particular classifica-
tion” (Mittelstadt, 2016, p. 4994). This can, in principle, be implemented at each 
stage of the algorithm’s development and lines up well with the regulator’s pro-
posed power to review the algorithm in situ. Impact auditing that investigates the 
“types, severity, and prevalence of effects of an algorithm’s outputs” is also advo-
cated which can be conducted while the algorithm is in use (Mittelstadt, 2016, p. 
4995). There is also reference made to the regulator requiring companies to 
demonstrate how algorithms select content for children, and to provide the means 
for testing the operation of these algorithms, which implies the development of 
accountable algorithms (Kroll et al., 2016). 
However, in the final government response to the consultation setting out the cur-
rent plans for the Bill, algorithms are barely mentioned. In the government’s final 
response, it is stated that search engines should ensure that “algorithms and pre-
dictive searches do not promote illegal content” referring specifically to child sex-
ual exploitation images (HM Government, 2020, para 1.3). This has been imple-
mented in the interim Code of Practice on child sexual exploitation images and 
abuse. No such reference is made in the duty of care for terrorist material or the 
corresponding interim Code of Practice on terrorist content and activity online. 
Transparency 
Where legislation does address content amplification explicitly, regulation is large-
ly limited to transparency requirements. Recommender systems are explicitly ad-
dressed in Article 29(1) of the EU Digital Services Act (2021). This requires very 
large platforms which use recommender systems to set out: 
In their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible 
manner, the main parameters used in their recommender systems, as well as 
any options for the recipients of the service to modify or influence those main 
parameters that they may have made available, including at least one option 
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which is not based on profiling. (2021, Art. 29(1)) 
The following article specifies further: where several options are available pur-
suant to Article 29(1) very large online platforms "shall provide an easily accessi-
ble functionality on their online interface allowing the recipient of the service to 
select and to modify at any time their preferred option for each of the recom-
mender systems that determines the relative order of information presented to 
them". In its current iteration, Facebook’s ‘why am I seeing this?’ tool likely meets 
these requirements (Sethuraman 2019). These sections only apply to very large 
platforms, defined as having an audience of at least 10% of the EU population 
(DSA 2020, para 54), and therefore smaller platforms may escape transparency re-
quirements. Additionally, the wording of Article 29 DSA provides a large amount of 
discretion to social media platforms as to what parameters they choose to make 
available for users to modify or influence, effectively affirming the social media 
platforms as the leaders of recommender system regulation (Helberger, 2021). This 
evokes the reminder that transparency afforded to users by the ‘why am I seeing 
this?’ tool is not total transparency. The data available to users, as well as re-
searchers, is subject to the politics of visibility and politics of knowledge within 
Facebook implemented via changes at an interface and software level (Stefanija & 
Pierson, 2020, p. 112). 
Like the DSA, where the Online Harms Bill does address the regulation of algo-
rithms, it is in pursuit of transparency. The UK government established a multi-
stakeholder Transparency Working Group which included representatives from civil 
society and industry including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter. Discus-
sions and recommendations in this group did not go much beyond the specifics of 
transparency reports (HM Government, 2020, para 2.2). One exception to this is 
that the recommendation reporting includes, where appropriate, information on 
the use of algorithms and automated processes in content moderation. However, it 
was noted that certain information about the operation of companies’ algorithms 
is commercially sensitive or could pose issues if user safety is publicly disclosed 
(HM Government, 2020, para 6.21). The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator refines 
this point by stating that companies’ transparency reports should include detailed 
information concerning their practices on recommendation; whether blocked or re-
moved illegal and borderline content was promoted by the platform’s algorithms. 
This should include several views, as well as data on how often the content was 
recommended to users, and whether human oversight was involved (Council of the 
European Union, 2020). 
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The German implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the Medi-
enstaatsvertrag (2020) does address the issue of content amplification but only re-
quires media platforms such as Netflix or Amazon Prime to be heavily regulated. 
So-called media intermediaries, such as YouTube or other video hosting sites, are 
given a lighter touch. In terms of transparency, for example, media platforms must 
disclose the way selection criteria are weighted, the functioning of the algorithm, 
how users can adjust and personalise the sorting and explain the reasoning be-
hind content recommendations (2020, pp. 78-90). By contrast, media intermedi-
aries must disclose the selection criteria that determine the sorting and presenta-
tion of content. These disclosures must be made in easily recognisable, directly ac-
cessible, and constantly available formats (ibid, pp. 91-96). Facebook’s ‘Why am I 
seeing this?’ goes further than its media intermediary obligation by disclosing the 
functioning of the algorithm and explaining the reasoning behind content recom-
mendations. One interesting provision prohibits media intermediaries from dis-
criminating against journalistic and editorial content or treating them differently 
without appropriate justification. If a provider of such content believes that they 
have been discriminated against, they can file a claim with the relevant state 
broadcasting authority (ibid, p. 94). It is difficult to imagine how discrimination 
could be proven in practice however, and it is unclear how this interacts with the 
objective of recommender systems, and search engines, which is to discriminate 
between content (Nelson and Jaursch, 2020). 
While these attempts at increased transparency are welcome, it does not solve the 
issue of the algorithmic promotion of borderline, but legal extremist material. 
While a user who is presented with clear information on why a particular video 
was recommended to them may reconsider watching said video, they may also dis-
regard it. This is particularly likely to happen if the recommended video is some-
thing that they are likely to find agreeable. Thus, regulation of this issue must 
move further than issues of transparency and into the issue of recommending bor-
derline content. This moves into a more ethically challenging area for legislators 
in deciding what is considered borderline. 
The case of borderline content 
Policymakers have suggested that algorithms promote legal, yet borderline con-
tent that can be harmful and lead to radicalisation. As a solution, many have ar-
gued that platforms should restrict the flow of legal, yet potentially harmful con-
tent to their audiences. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator notes that systems 
are specifically designed to target users and not just organise content generally, 
therefore there should be no exemption from liability (Council of the European 
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Union, 2020). While there is an argument that platforms such as YouTube are not 
the neutral intermediaries that they claim to be (Suzor, 2018), this would seem to 
take this argument to an impractical conclusion. 
Although studies, including ours, do find there to be extreme and fringe content 
that within platforms’ recommendations, they use neither a legal definition of ex-
tremism, nor one that mirrors terms of service. Extremism is a difficult phenome-
non to define and identify and is subject to a great degree of academic debate (for 
example, see: Schmid, 2013; Berger, 2018a). This invariably leads to a sizable grey 
zone of borderline content that represents a challenge for regulation (Bishop et al., 
2019; Vegt et al., 2019; Conway, 2020). In the face of such liability, over-removal is 
a potential problem, leading to concerns around free speech. The Coordinator at-
tempts to address this problem by citing the platforms’ ability to automatically 
find, limit and remove copyrighted content. However, this is clearly not a reason-
able comparison given the much greater sized grey area around extreme content 
and the freedom of expression issues that arise. 
It is unclear whether this action would be contrary to EU law. Article 14 of the e-
Commerce Directive exempts intermediaries from liability for the content they 
manage if they fulfil certain conditions including removing illegal content as fast 
as possible once they are aware of its illegal nature, and that they play a neutral, 
merely technical and passive role towards the hosted content (e-Commerce Direc-
tive, 2000, Art. 14). The European Court of Justice takes a case-by-case approach to 
whether a hosting intermediary has taken a passive role, however, the use of algo-
rithms or automatic means to select, organise or present the information would 
not be sufficient to automatically meet the active role standard (Google France and 
Google 2010, paras 115-120). This was echoed by the European Commission in 
stating that the mere fact that an intermediary hosting service provider ‘takes cer-
tain measures relating to the provision of its services in a general manner does not 
necessarily mean that it plays an active role in respect of the individual content 
items it stores’ (European Commission 2017, p. 11). 
This approach has been criticised by Tech Against Terrorism, who argue that discus-
sions of removing legal content from recommendations are misplaced and do not 
understand the nature of terrorists’ use of the internet. They argue that it has 
harmful implications for the freedom of speech and the rule of law and raises seri-
ous concerns over extra-legal norm-setting. Moreover, the definitional subjectivity 
of concepts like extremism (as laid out above) or “harmful” result in this being dif-
ficult to operationalise (Tech Against Terrorism, 2021). They assert that norm-set-
ting should be created by consensus-driven mechanisms which are driven by de-
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mocratically accountable institutions. 
Some platforms have taken steps to remove borderline content from their recom-
mendations unilaterally. In 2017, YouTube announced that content that did not 
clearly violate its policies but was deemed potentially extreme (they give exam-
ples of inflammatory religious or supremacist content) would appear behind a 
warning and not be available for monetisation, recommendation, and not eligible 
for comments or endorsements (Walker, 2017). They argue that this would make 
the content harder to find, striking the right balance between free speech and ac-
cess to information without amplifying extreme viewpoints. Facebook has adopted 
this approach too; they offer a range of factors that may cause them to remove 
content that is permitted from recommendations. Relevant for this discussion, they 
include accounts that have recently violated the platform’s community standards, 
as well as accounts that are associated with offline movements that are tied to vi-
olence (Facebook, n.d.). Reddit has a policy of “quarantining” subreddits that are 
grossly offensive, which removes it from the platform’s recommendation system 
and forces users to opt-in to see content (Reddit, 2021). One example of this is r/
The_Donald, which Gaudette et al. (2020) identify as hosting problematic extrem-
ist content. However, the platform has been accused of only applying these mea-
sures after the subreddit had received negative media attention (Romano, 2017). 
Currently, choosing to remove legal, yet potentially problematic content from rec-
ommendations is a choice for individual platforms—i.e. self-regulation. However, 
this can be problematic, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator argues, if platforms 
being unable or unwilling to de-amplify content: ‘Some companies have no incen-
tive to promote a variety of viewpoints or content…since recommending polarising 
content remains the most efficient way to expand watch time and gather more da-
ta on customers, to better target advertising and increase the returns’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2020, p. 5). This speaks to the lack of a strong natural coinci-
dence between the public and private interest in this area. Absent such a natural 
coincidence, one or more external pressures sufficient to create such a coincidence 
are needed (Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 390). As discussed above, there are al-
so issues with regulation which holds platforms liable for this type of content; 
therefore, we advocate the use of co-regulation to achieve this coincidence. 
Towards co-regulation 
We define co-regulation as a regulatory scheme which combines elements of self-
regulation (and self-monitoring) with elements of traditional public authority and 
private sector elements. A key aspect of a co-regulatory regime is the self-con-
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tained development of binding rules by the co-regulatory organisation and the re-
sponsibility of this organisation for these rules (Palzer, 2003). While this concept 
encompasses a range of regulatory phenomena, each co-regulatory regime con-
sists of a complex interaction of general legislation and a self-regulatory body 
(Marsden, 2010, p 222). In the EU context it is defined as a mechanism whereby a 
community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by the 
legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field. 
There are opportunities to implement co-regulation in present and upcoming leg-
islation. In the UK Online Harms Bill, the government will set objectives for the 
regulator’s (Ofcom) code of practice in secondary legislation to provide clarity for 
the framework. Ofcom will have a duty to consult interested parties on the devel-
opment of the codes of practice (HM Government 2020, para. 31). The require-
ments for consultation are low, meaning that not only social media companies but 
other stakeholders such as civil society can participate. However, as highlighted 
above, the UK Government's final consultation which sets out the current plans for 
the Online Harms Bill makes little mention of plans to regulate recommender sys-
tems or other content amplification; it remains unclear whether they will be ad-
dressed in the development of the codes of practice. 
The DSA also provides a mechanism for very large platforms to cooperate in the 
drawing-up of codes of conduct, thus providing another avenue for co-regulation 
of this issue (DSA 2020, Art. 35). A co-regulatory scheme wherein government, in-
dustry and civil society can fully participate would be the appropriate venue to 
find the solution to the issue of the amplification of borderline and extremist con-
tent. This lines up with previous work on the increasingly shared responsibilities 
between states and companies, and the trend that social media platforms are 
adopting measures which are increasingly similar to administrative law (Heldt, 
2019). Of particular note is the framework of cooperative responsibility sketched 
out by Helberger, Pierson, and Poell (2017) which emphasises the need for dynam-
ic interaction between platforms, users and public institutions in realising core 
public values in these online sectors. This still leaves the issue of the ethical and 
practical implications of who decides what is inappropriate to be amplified but do-
ing so in a consensual manner has clear benefits. 
The primary benefit of a co-regulatory approach is the avoidance of self-regulatory 
or public authority regulatory approaches (Palzer, 2003). One issue with self-regu-
lation is that there may be an accountability gap as the social media companies in 
question are responsible for holding themselves accountable (Campbell, 1998). 
Presently, that may lead to little being done to tackle the issue of amplification of 
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borderline and extremist content. Sufficiently bad press may provoke the company 
to act, but this could be subject to short-termism as the company acts in their im-
mediate economic self-interest which could lead to hasty and arbitrary decisions 
(Gunningham and Rees, 1997). Thus far, initiatives to regulate social media plat-
forms have been mostly self-regulatory such as the Global Internet Forum to 
Counter Terrorism, the Facebook Oversight Board, or the above-mentioned meth-
ods to remove content from recommendations. 
Public authority regulatory approaches may lead to a knowledge gap, as states’ at-
tempts to regulate technology may be outdated by the time they are implemented 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). For example, the Online Harms Bill was proposed in 
2017 and as of the writing of this paper has still not been introduced to Parlia-
ment. A co-regulatory approach provides the opportunity to implement novel solu-
tions such as algorithmic auditing and accountable algorithms. A regulatory body 
such as Ofcom could work with social media platforms to conduct developmental 
auditing to develop adequate and sufficient safeguards in their algorithms. It could 
analyse the impact the algorithm has on the average user, potentially through sim-
ilar methodologies as this paper, although on a much-expanded scale. Another 
benefit of a co-regulatory approach to this issue is that it avoids giving the respon-
sibility for filling in the details of the law to programme developers. This avoids 
the problem of a programme developer designing a wide-ranging algorithm to 
solve a political problem, which the developer likely has little substantive exper-
tise on, and with slight possibility of political accountability (Kroll et al., 2016). 
Wachter and Mittelstadt have advocated a right to ‘reasonable inferences’ to close 
the accountability gap posed by big data inferences which damage privacy, reputa-
tion, or are used in important decisions despite having low verifiability (Wachter 
and Mittelstadt, 2019). Should such a right be established, a co-regulatory body 
could audit or help design algorithms which keep inferences and subsequent rec-
ommendations, nudges and manipulations to a reasonable level. 
Conclusion 
We anticipate that the role of social media recommendation algorithms and ex-
tremist content will continue to be a point of policy concern moving forward. It 
seems inevitable that news organisations will continue to publish stories that 
highlight instances of unsavoury content being recommended to users and policy-
makers will continue to be concerned that this is harmful to users and may exacer-
bate radicalisation trajectories. This article has sought to provide clarity towards 
this future debate in two ways. Firstly, it has provided the first empirical assess-
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ment of interactions between extremist content and platforms’ recommendation 
systems in an experimental condition while accounting for personalisation. The 
findings suggest that one platform—YouTube—may promote far-right materials af-
ter a user interacts with it. The other two platforms—Reddit and Gab—showed no 
signs of amplifying extreme content via their recommendations. 
Secondly, we contextualise these findings into the policy debate. At first glance, 
our research seems to support policy concerns regarding radical filter bubbles. 
However, we argue that our findings also point towards other problematic aspects 
of contemporary social media. More focus needs to be paid to the online radical 
milieu and the audience of extremist messaging. Despite repeatedly being sig-
nalled out by policymakers as problematic, there are currently few instruments in 
place for social media regulation. Moreover, where regulatory policy does exist, it 
tends to focus on transparency, which while welcome, is only one potential solu-
tion to the amplification of extreme content alone. We argue that policy is yet to 
fully understand the difficulties with “grey area” content as it relates to content 
amplification. Currently, platforms are left to self-regulate in this area and policy-
makers argue that they can do more. However, self-regulation can be problematic 
because of a lack of coincidence between public and private interests. We argue 
that a movement towards co-regulation offers numerous benefits as it can shorten 
the accountability gap while maintaining the opportunity for novel solutions from 
industry leaders. 
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